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We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a region comprising two 
districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have 
positive spillover effects on the neighboring district, there is underprovision of public goods 
in both the city and the village. When districts consolidate, underprovision persists in the 
village (and may become even more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in 
the city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare 
point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to vote for consolidation. 
We examine how national transfers to local governments can resolve these problems. 
JEL Code: D7, H2, H7, R5. 








Department of Economics H 8-15 
Erasmus University 
P.O. Box 1738 




Institute for International Economics 










June 2007 1 Introduction
Inhabitants of villages that are located close by a city usually benet con-
siderably from the services provided by the city. Many villagers work in the
city. Moreover, they often nd the city a good place to spend their leisure
time. In as far as public services are concerned, the costs of services provided
by the city are commonly completely borne by the inhabitants of the city.
As inhabitants of cities usually benet to a much smaller extent from the
services provided in villages than villagers benet from cities' services, rep-
resentatives of cities and provinces have claimed that the distribution of the
tax burden is unfair.1 In addition, the interjurisdictional spillover eects of
public good provision may give rise to severe underprovision as voters in the
city do not take into account the benets of the city's public good provision
on the welfare of the villagers. The same holds for public good provision in
the village in as far as urbanites benet from public good provision in the
village (Oates (1972)).
A natural policy response to these problems is to consolidate cities and
villages. Unsurprisingly, inhabitants of villages often ercely oppose consoli-
dation as it entails large tax increases.2 Villagers claim that the only goal of
consolidation is to relieve the nancial problems of the city. Moreover, they
fear that their interests will be ignored because they constitute a minority
in political decision-making bodies after consolidation. Consequently, public
good provision in the village may be reduced. When villagers have the right
to decide on whether to consolidate with a city or not, consolidation will
therefore be a rare event.
This paper studies how national transfers to local governments can resolve
these problems. We analyze a simple model of the provision and nancing of
1See, for example, Vojnovic (2000) on municipal consolidation in Canada, who notes
that \Several provinces have expressed concern over residential and business investors
locating just beyond urbanised boundaries, making extensive use of more expensive cus-
tomised services in the urban jurisdiction, while paying lower rural tax rates." (p.49-50).
See also Bradford and Oates (1974) for an insightful discussion and an overview of empir-
ical studies on suburban exploitation of central cities.
2For instance, Kushner and Siegel (2003) study amalgamations in Ontario and re-
port that, in the years immediately following amalgamation, there was signicant protest
from the residents of the former suburban municipalities that their taxes were increasing
rapidly. Vojnovic (2000), discussing the experiences in Miramichi, Canada, reports that
\The amalgamation has not been able to resolve the inequties in the tax structure within
the region, instead it has simply reversed the outcome. As the rates are harmonised,
rural residents are increasingly over-charged for services received. The residents of the
urban areas, on the other hand, benet from a rich bundle of municipal services while
the costs of these services are distributed among ratepayers throughout the amalgamated
municipality." (p.54).
1nonrival public goods by local governments in a country consisting of a large
number of heterogeneous regions. Each region consists of two districts that
dier in size: a city and a village. The districts either form one municipality
or remain autonomous. We assume that consolidation requires the consent
of a majority of voters both in the city and in the village. In line with earlier
studies, we nd that when districts remain autonomous, there is underprovi-
sion of local public goods in both districts. Underprovision of public goods
in the village persists after consolidation, and may become even more severe.
In the city, consolidation results in overprovision of public goods, as the ur-
banites start exploiting the villagers. Taxes are higher after consolidation,
both in the city and in the village. We also show that from a social welfare
point of view, voters in the village have insucient incentives to vote for
consolidation.
We consider the eects of two types of national transfers: an earmarked
transfer that increases with local public good provision and a lump-sum
transfer to municipalities that is independent of population size. An ear-
marked subsidy helps to mitigate the underprovision problem. A lump-sum
tax strengthens the incentives for consolidation. Heterogeneity between re-
gions causes neither of these transfers to attain the rst-best. Earmarked
transfers promote welfare as they increase public goods provision in au-
tonomous districts, but exacerbate the problem of overprovision of public
goods in cities that merged with a village. Moreover, even when all districts
remain autonomous, dierences in the size of the spillover eect between re-
gions cause earmarked transfers to result in overprovision in some regions,
while underprovision persists in other regions. A lump-sum tax that is in-
dependent of population size promotes consolidation in regions where it is
socially desirable, but also in regions where districts can better remain au-
tonomous. The optimal lump-sum transfer as well as the optimal earmarked
transfer entail a trade o between these desired and undesired eects and
crucially depend on the exact distribution of relative population sizes and
spillover eects over regions.
Transfers from national governments to local governments are widespread.
For instance, in the Netherlands, about 7% of the national government bud-
get is transferred to local governments through the `Gemeentefonds'. Parts of
these transfers are earmarked. In Germany, the `Gemeindenanzierungsge-
setz' arranges the transfers from the `L ander' to the `Kommunen'. Transfers
from the federal and state governments consist of earmarked transfers, free
transfers, and redistributive transfers. In Sweden, local governments receive
general grants and equalization grants from the `staten'. In the US, towns re-
ceive intergovernmental grants from the federal government, from the state,
and from the county. A recent OECD report gives a broad overview of scal
2relations across levels of government and shows that in many countries a
substantial part of intergovernmental transfers to municipalities is aimed at
internalisation of spillover eects (OECD (2006)). Furthermore, they note
that \Intermunicipal co-operation has been and remains an important ele-
ment of most national programmes." (p.25). For instance, in France, national
authorities introduced special supplementary grants in 1999 with the aim of
centralizing decision-making on local service provision.
The economics literature gives little attention to the eect of transfers
on incentives for consolidation.3 One reason is that most papers on political
geography focus on the formation of countries rather than on consolidation
of local jurisdictions. Related to the present paper are Alesina and Spolaore
(1997), Bolton and Roland (1996, 1997), Goyal and Staal (2004), and Alesina,
Baqir, and Hoxby (2004).4 In contrast to the present analysis, these papers
assume that centralized policy is uniform. Our set-up is close to Besley and
Coate (2003), who study the merits of centralized provision of local public
goods when provision need not be uniform across jurisdictions. The main
dierences between our paper and theirs is that we endogenize the decision on
centralization and that we allow for transfers from a higher-level government.
Three other papers are close to our analysis. First, Calabrese, Cassidy,
and Epple (2002) develop a computational model to study the eects of and
political support for municipal consolidation. Their main focus is on local
redistributive policies and housing prices. Ellingsen (1998) studies the eects
of inter- and intra-regional heterogeneity in preferences and the relative size of
regions on political integration. Heterogeneity in preferences between regions
also plays a key role in Lockwood (2002). None of these papers examines the
role of transfers from a national government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Next, in section 3.1, we derive the socially optimal amounts of local public
goods. Section 3.2 examines the outcome of voting on public good provision,
when districts are autonomous and when they are consolidated. Section
3.3 derives the conditions under which districts decide to consolidate. In
section 3.4, these conditions are compared with the conditions for socially
optimal consolidation. Section 4 examines the eects of national transfers to
municipalities. Section 5 extends our analysis in two ways: we introduce tax
discrimination and we allow for an opportunity to secede after consolidation.
3There is, however, a large literature on intergovernmental transfers where jurisdictional
boundaries are taken as given, most prominently Oates (1972), Gordon (1983), Persson and
Tabellini (1996), Dixit and Londregan (1998), and Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau
(1998). For a survey, see Oates (1999).




Consider a country consisting of many regions. Each region consists of two
districts (cities, villages). Districts in a region dier from each other in
population size; otherwise they are identical. The population size of district
i in region j is denoted by ij. Inhabitants of a district are homogenous and
immobile.
Districts in a region either form one municipality or two separate munic-
ipalities. Forming one municipality requires majority support in each of the
districts. A municipality is responsible for the provision of local pure public
goods. Decisions on public goods provision are taken by majority rule. The
amount of public goods provided in district i in region j is denoted by gij.
Public goods provided in a district have positive spillover eects on the other






g ij + y   tij (1)
where g ij is the amount of public goods provided in the other district in
region j, j 2 [0;1] measures the degree of spillovers in region j, y denotes
the before-tax private income per capita, and tij is a local lump-sum tax.
Note that we abstract from income heterogeneity. Further, we assume that
public goods and private goods are separable in the utility function and that
taxes are nondistortionary. A convenient implication is that we can omit y.
We will discuss some of the consequences of these assumptions along the way
and in the concluding section.
The cost of a public good is equal to p units of private goods. Public
goods are nanced by local lump-sum taxes, tij, and by transfers from the
central government to the local governments, f(). The latter may depend
on, e.g., the population size of the municipality and on the amount of public
goods provided. If districts in region j are two separate municipalities, the
local government's budget constraint reads:
pgij = f () + tijij (2)
If districts in region j form one municipality, the budget constraint is:
p(gij + g ij) = f () + tj (ij +  ij) (3)
Note that we impose that the per capita taxes within a municipality are
uniform across districts. We relax this assumption in section 5.
43 Local public good provision and municipal
consolidation
We structure our analysis as follows. First, we derive the socially optimal
levels of local public goods. Next, we analyze political decision making and
contrast the outcomes with the normative benchmark. The political decision
making process consists of two stages. First, voters in each district vote on
whether to consolidate with the neighboring district into one municipality
or to remain autonomous. Next, there is a vote on the amount(s) of pub-
lic goods in each municipality. For the moment, we abstract from central
funding, f() = 0. In section 4, we study national transfers aimed at improv-
ing the allocative eciency of local public good provision in heterogenous
regions. Since we abstract from interregional spillovers, and inhabitants are
immobile, we restrict attention in this section to public goods provision and
consolidation of municipalities in a particular region. For convenience, we
drop the subscript j, and we denote the larger district in the region as the
city (c) and the smaller district as the village (v), c > v.
3.1 Social optimum
We dene the social optimum as the outcome that maximizes the unweighted










gc)   pgc   pgv (4)
The social surplus maximizing public good levels (gs
c;gs
v) that result from

















Hence, the socially optimal amount of public goods in each district increases
in the population size of both districts, increases in the size of the spillover
eect, and decreases in the cost of public goods provision.
3.2 Voting on public goods provision
First consider the case where districts remain autonomous. Recall that voters
are homogenous within districts. Hence, the outcome of voting in district i
5is found by maximizing (1) with respect to gi and ti subject to the budget



















Clearly, local public goods are underprovided when districts are autonomous
[compare (7) and (8) with (5) and (6), respectively]. The reason is that
voters in each district do not take into account the positive spillover eect of
public goods on welfare in the other district. Underprovision is more severe
for larger spillover eects and for a larger population size of the neighboring
district.
When districts consolidate into one municipality, the inhabitants of the
city are in a majority and, therefore, gc and gv are set according to their
wishes. Maximizing (1) with respect to gc, gv, and t subject to the budget

















Consolidation leads to overprovision of public goods in the city, whereas un-
derprovision of public goods in the village persists and may become even more
severe than under autonomy [compare (9) and (10) with (5) and (6) and with
(7) and (8), respectively]. The intuition is clear. Consolidation broadens the
tax base. Hence, the per capita tax per unit of public good is lower. This
induces inhabitants of the city (the decisive voters) to increase the amount of
public goods provided in their district. Since they do not take into account
the tax cost to the inhabitants of the village, and the villagers benet less
from public goods provided in the city than the urbanites, public goods pro-
vision in the city is higher than socially optimal. The eect of consolidation
on the amount of public goods provided in the village is ambiguous. On the
one hand, the per capita tax per unit of public good decreases, resulting in
an increase in the amount of public goods provided. This eect is larger
for a larger population size of the city relative to that of the village. On
the other hand, it is the urbanites, not the villagers, who decide on public
goods provision after consolidation. This reduces the amount of public goods
provided in the village as urbanites care less about the public goods in the
6village than do the villagers. This eect is larger for a smaller spillover eect.
Comparing (10) with (8), it follows that consolidation increases public goods
supply in the village if  > v
c+v. Hence, public goods supply in the village
increases if the spillover eect or the relative population size of the city is
suciently large. Since v < c,   1
2 is a sucient condition. In all cases,
underprovision of public goods persists in the village as inhabitants of the
city care less than the inhabitants of the village about public goods supply
in the village [compare (10) with (6)].
Lastly, it is easily veried that the per capita tax is always higher when
districts consolidate than when they remain autonomous and - in the latter






















Clearly, when public and private goods would not be separable in the utility
function, this need not be the case because income eects come into play.
3.3 Voting on municipal consolidation
In each district, there is a vote on whether to consolidate with the neighboring
district into one municipality or to remain autonomous. Using the results












Unsurprisingly, this condition is always satised. Consolidation benets the
inhabitants of the city as it brings about a broader tax base and the right to























The right-hand side is (weakly) positive for all permissible values of  ( 2
[0;1]). The left-hand side is strictly negative when  2 [0;2  
p
2). Hence,
when the spillover eect is small, villagers oppose consolidation for any values
of v and c. For  > 2  
p
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Figure 1: Vote on municipal consolidation
3/2-(Ö3)/2
Figure 1: Vote on municipal consolidation.
This condition is depicted in Figure 1.
Since v=c < 1, consolidation can only be in the villagers' interest if
 > 3=2   1
2
p
3. The villagers' incentive to consolidate becomes stronger
as the spillover eect is larger. The intuition is clear. After consolidation,
public goods provision reects the wishes of the urbanites. When spillovers
are small, consolidation reduces the level of public goods that are provided
in the village while the tax burden increases as villagers now have to pay for
the public goods provided in the city. In addition, when spillovers are small,
villagers benet little from the increase in public goods supply in the city.
When spillovers are larger, consolidation may increase public goods provision
in the village and villagers benet to a larger extent from the increase in
public goods provision in the city. If spillovers are suciently large, the
welfare gain from the increase in public goods compensates for the increase
in the tax.
More surprisingly, provided that  > 2 
p
2, the incentive to consolidate
increases in the relative size of the village, while the reverse holds when
 < 2  
p
2. Two eects, working in opposite directions, play a role.
First, the villagers must pay for the public goods that are provided in the
city when they decide to consolidate, while they can free ride on the city's tax
payers when they remain autonomous. The larger is the city's population
size, the larger is the tax increase for the villagers. A larger population
size in the city thus weakens the incentive to consolidate. Consolidation,
however, also increases the amount of public goods provided in the city as
it broadens the tax base. This eect increases in the population size of the
village. If  < 1
2, the positive eect of higher public good provision in the
8city on villagers' utility does not compensate for the accompanied increase
in the tax burden. Then, a larger population size in the village reduces
the incentive to consolidate. If  > 1
2, the villagers' benet from increased
public good provision in the city is larger than the utility loss from the tax
increase. Then, a larger population size in the village makes it more likely
that villagers support consolidation.
Second, for any value of , a higher population size in the city promotes
consolidation as it becomes more likely that public goods provision in the
village increases. In contrast, the more populous the village, the weaker
the incentive to consolidate. When the village is large, the level of public
goods under autonomy is already high and, hence, it becomes less likely that
consolidation results in an increase in public goods provision in the village.
Taking the two eects together, it follows that the incentive to consolidate
decreases in the relative size of the village when spillovers are small ( <
2 
p
2), while the reverse holds when spillovers are large ( > 2 
p
2). Since
villagers can only be in favor of consolidation when  > 2 
p
2, our analysis
thus implies that smaller villages are less likely to support consolidation. The
results of a recent empirical study on support for consolidation in Norway
are well in line with this prediction (Srensen (2006)).
3.4 Socially optimal consolidation
Consolidation is only in the villagers' interest when spillovers are large and
the village is not too small relative to the city. An important question is
under what conditions consolidation brings the region closer to the social
optimum. In other words, do villagers have sucient incentives to vote for
consolidation from a social welfare point of view? Comparing social welfare












c < 0 (14)
When  > 2 
p
2, the rst term is negative and, hence, consolidation always
increases social welfare. When  < 2  
p






2   4 + 2 (15)
This condition is depicted in Figure 2, together with the political feasibility
constraint which we have derived in the previous section.
Consolidation increases welfare if the spillover eect is suciently large.
If  > 1
2, consolidation always increases welfare. A large spillover eect





Figure 2: Social optimality and political feasibility
of municipal consolidation.
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consolidation is socially optimal, 
but not politically feasible
αv/αc
Figure 2: Social optimality and political feasibility of municipal consolida-
tion.
likely that public goods supply in both the city and the village increase after
consolidation. When the spillover eect is small, consolidation only increases
aggregate welfare if the village is small relative to the city. The intuition is
straightforward. The smaller the village, the smaller is the increase in the
tax base, and hence the less severe the overprovision of public goods in the
city after consolidation. Moreover, when the village is small relative to the
city, it is more likely that consolidation increases public good provision in the
village, and hence partly resolves the underprovision problem in the village.
Clearly, villagers' incentives to vote for consolidation are insucient from a
social welfare point of view. The reason is that they do not take into account
the eect of consolidation on the welfare of the urbanites.
4 National transfers
In the previous section, we have shown that: i) autonomous districts under-
provide public goods; ii) consolidation does not solve (may even worsen) the
problem of underprovision in the smallest district and results in overprovi-
sion in the largest district; iii) voters in the smallest district have insucient
incentives to vote for consolidation from a social welfare point of view. This
section examines how the national government may improve upon the decen-
tralized equilibrium outcome by conditioning national transfers to municipal-
ities on local characteristics. We assume that the national government can
10condition transfers to municipalities on population size and on the levels of
public goods that are provided. The national government does not observe
the size of the spillover eect in dierent regions. If it could condition trans-
fers also on the size of the spillover eect, the national government could
generate any level of public good provision (including rst-best provision in
all districts) without creating any distortions. We feel that it is plausible
to assume that the national government lacks information about spillover
eects in dierent regions. We analyze the eects of two types of transfers:
i) a transfer that is conditional on the level of public goods and that must
be spent on public goods (earmarked transfers) and ii) a lump-sum trans-
fer per municipality that is independent of population size. The earmarked
transfer helps mitigating the underprovision problem. The lump-sum trans-
fer aects the incentives for consolidation and may thus indirectly increase
the allocative eciency of public goods provision in the economy.
4.1 Earmarked transfer
The national government gives a transfer of  per unit of public good provided
in each municipality. The transfer is earmarked: it must be spent on the
public good that it is conditioned on. The national government nances the
subsidy to local public good provision by means of a national income tax.
We assume that the number of municipalities is suciently large, such that
a single municipality's decisions have a negligible eect on the national tax
rate. Hence, we can safely ignore the national tax in the analysis of local
public goods provision and consolidation of municipalities.
First consider autonomous districts. Maximizing (1) with respect to gi,
subject to the budget constraint (2), and recognizing that each unit of gi
delivers (1 + )gi through the transfer scheme, results in the equilibrium









Comparing (7) with (16), it follows that the level of public goods increases in
the earmarked transfer. Similarly, when the districts in region j consolidate,

















11It is easily veried that the earmarked transfer does not aect the incentives
to consolidate. The reason is that the transfer  increases welfare under
the dierent regimes equiproportionally. For the same reason, the condition
under which consolidation is socially optimal is not aected by the level of
the earmarked transfer.
Earmarked transfers do not bring about socially optimal public goods
provision for at least two reasons. First, in regions where districts have
merged, earmarked transfers aggravate the problem of overprovision of public
goods in the largest district.5 Second, when spillover eects dier between
regions, a given level of  is too low in some regions, while it is too high in
others. Hence, underprovision will persist in some regions, while earmarked
transfers cause overprovision in other regions.6 The optimal level of  will
crucially depend on the exact distribution of j's over regions as well as on
the distribution of v
c over regions.
4.2 Lump-sum transfer
Another, less direct way to enhance allocative eciency of public goods pro-
vision is to promote consolidation of districts. As we saw in the previous
section, the villagers have insucient incentive to consolidate from a so-
cial welfare point of view. A simple way to strengthen the incentives to
consolidate is to make a lump-sum transfer to each municipality, which is
independent of the municipality's population size. Suppose the national gov-
5In order to achieve socially optimal public good provision in consolidated districts,




  1 < 0
vj =
v + jc
j (c + v)
  1 > 0
i.e. a subsidy for public good provision in the village and a tax on public good provision
in the city. This follows from comparing (17) and (18) with (5) and (6). Note that the
optimal transfers depend on population sizes as well as on the spillover eect, which is not
observed by the national government.
6Conditioning  on the population size of municipalities helps, but does not eliminate
the problem. To illustrate this, consider transfers to autonomous districts. In order to
achieve socially optimal public good provision, the earmarked transfer to district i in region





This follows from comparing (16) with (5) and (6). The optimal earmarked transfer to
autonomous districts thus decreases with the relative size of the district in the region and
increases with the size of the spillover eect of public goods in the region.





















Clearly,  < 0 promotes consolidation. A lump-sum tax makes it more likely
that villagers support consolidation as consolidation enables them to share
the lump-sum tax with more people. It is easily veried that if a lump-sum
transfer does not change the decision on consolidation, then the amounts
of public goods that are provided will not change. The reason is that the
utility function is quasi-linear. Just like the earmarked transfer, the lump-
sum transfer is, however, not a distortion-free instrument. Since the national
government does not observe j, the lump-sum tax is either too low to induce
consolidation in all cases in which consolidation is socially desirable, and/or
the lump-sum tax is so high that some small villages have an incentive to
consolidate while it would be socially optimal to remain autonomous.7 The
optimal lump-sum transfer entails a trade o between these two eects and
will crucially depend on the exact distribution of j over regions.8
7Using (14) and (19), we nd that the level of the lump-sum transfer that would induce






















where the left-hand side is the per-capita lump-sum tax advantage for villagers who choose
consolidation (recall that  is negative). The right-hand side decreases with the size of the
village and increases with the size of the city. The reason is simple. As shown in section
3.4, the social-welfare benets from consolidation increase with the relative size of the city,
while the political willingness of the villagers decreases with the relative size of the city. To
correct for this, a larger tax advantage should be given when the village is smaller and when
the city is larger. Moreover, the right-hand side increases with  if (c + v) > v. The
intuition follows. Public good provision in the village decreases after consolidation when
(c + v) < v, compare (8) with (10). Hence, when  increases and (c + v) < v,
consolidation becomes less favorable from a social-welfare perspective. The reverse holds
when (c + v) > v.
8We have attempted to derive optimal transfer schemes for specic distributions of
j, but we either failed to obtain a solution or felt that the solution did not bring much
additional insights.
135 Extensions: Tax discrimination and the threat
of secession
This section relaxes two important assumptions underlying the previous anal-
ysis: uniform taxes in consolidated districts and irreversibility of consolida-
tion.9 We start by introducing tax discrimination. Next we examine how
our results change when, after consolidation, the village can make a credible
threat to secede.
5.1 Tax discrimination
Suppose local governments can condition taxes on observable individual char-
acteristics. Since people in our model dier only in their place of residence
(city or village), the opportunity to dierentiate taxes does not aect the
results in case districts remain autonomous. Moreover, since utility is linear
in income, the social optimum as described in section 3.4 is also unaected.
However, when districts have consolidated, the majority of voters (the in-
habitants of the city) have an incentive to dierentiate taxes according to
place of residence. Obviously, maximizing the utility of the urbanites (1)
with respect to gc, gv, tc, and tv subject to the budget constraint
p(gc + gv) = tcc + tvv (20)
results in an innitely high tax tv on villagers. Given that income is nite,
it is natural to impose a restriction on the maximum value of tv. Let us
denote this maximum tax by t. We shall assume that t  tu
v, so that the
outcome under consolidation with uniform taxes can, in principle, still be
implemented. Irrespective of the level of t, the following levels of public

















Comparing (21) and (22) with the socially optimal levels of public goods de-
rived in section 3.1, it follows that under tax discrimination there is always
underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village after consoli-
dation. This contrasts with the case of uniform taxes studied in section 3.2,
9We thank two anonymous referees for comments which led to this section.
14where after consolidation public goods are underprovided in the village but
overprovided in the city. The reason for this dierence is intuitive. In sec-
tion 3.2, the urbanites could use tax revenues from the village only for public
goods provision, either in the city or in the village. In the present section,
they have the additional option to use these revenues for tax reductions in
the city. As a result, the urbanites no longer increase public good provi-
sion in the city in order to extract rents from the villagers. Indeed, public
good provision in the city after consolidation is the same as under autonomy,
compare (21) with (7). For reasons similar to those already spelled out in
section 3.2, public goods supply in the village can be higher or lower than
under autonomy depending on the relative size of the village and the size of
the spillover eect. Comparing (22) with (8), it follows that consolidation
increases public goods supply in the village only if  > v
c. Note that this
condition is more strict than under uniform taxes. As tax discrimination
allows urbanites to extract rents from the villagers without increasing public
goods supply, they have weaker incentives to supply public goods both in the
village and in the city.
The opportunity to dierentiate taxes increases the potential benets
from consolidation for urbanites, because it gives them an additional instru-
ment to extract rents from the villagers. Hence, as in section 3.3, urbanites
are always in favor of consolidation. For villagers, tax discrimination makes
consolidation less attractive for three reasons: 1) if t > tu
v, then they pay
higher taxes than under uniform taxes; 2) public goods supply in the vil-
lage decreases more or increases less than under uniform taxes, compare (22)
with (8) and (10); 3) public goods supply in the city remains constant rather
than increases after consolidation, compare (21) with (7) and (9). Using our







that is, when the tax increase (as described by the right-hand side of the
inequality) is more than oset by a utility increase arising from an increase
in public goods provision in the village (as described by the left-hand side of
the inequality). For ease of comparison, suppose that the maximum tax on
villagers t equals the tax after consolidation under uniform taxation tu
v, as











As in (12), the right-hand side is (weakly) positive for all permissible val-
ues of . The left-hand side is strictly negative for all permissible values of
15. Hence, if the maximum tax on villagers t equals the tax after consolida-
tion under uniform taxation tu
v, then villagers always oppose consolidation.
Obviously, the same holds when we relax this constraint on t, allowing ur-
banites to impose higher taxes on villagers than under uniform taxes. We
can thus conclude that, for any parametrization, tax discrimination elimi-
nates the willingness of the villagers to consolidate with the city out of fear
of exploitation by the urbanites. Even though consolidation may result in
an increase in public goods supply in the village, this never makes up for the
tax hike following consolidation.
Next, let us consider under which condition consolidation increases social
welfare given that urbanites can dierentiate taxes. Comparing social welfare
under autonomy and under consolidation, we nd that consolidation increases
welfare if:
c > v (25)
This condition has an easy interpretation. Recall that consolidation does not
aect public goods supply in the city. Moreover, changes in the distribution
of the tax burden over urbanites and villagers do not aect social welfare due
to the quasi-linearity of the utility function. Hence, any welfare eects from
consolidation stem from changes in public goods supply in the village. Since
public goods are underprovided under autonomy, consolidation increases so-
cial welfare when it results in higher public goods supply in the village. This
happens when condition (25) is satised (see also (8) and (22)). Hence, when
the spillover eect is large enough and the relative size of the village is small
enough, consolidation is socially optimal. Yet, as we have seen, it is not
politically feasible.
Lastly, let us consider the eects of earmarked and lump-sum transfers
from the national government. Earmarked transfers have eects similar to
those in section 4.1. Lump-sum taxes can promote consolidation, but they
need to be higher than in section 4.2. Following the same steps as above




























Hence, when  < 0 and suciently low (that is, the lump-sum tax is suf-
ciently high), villagers favor consolidation even when tax discrimination is
possible.
165.2 Threat of secession
This section examines how our results of the previous section change when the
inhabitants of the village have an opportunity to secede after consolidation.10
We assume that secession comes at a per-capita cost s  0 to the village.11
The opportunity to secede imposes an additional constraint on the urbanites:
in order to avoid secession, urbanites must choose taxes and public goods
supply such that villagers are at least as well o under consolidation as after
a secession. Urbanites thus maximize their utility (1) with respect to gc, gv,











+ y   s (26)
where the right-hand side is the utility of the villagers after secession.12
Clearly, in the optimum, the urbanites will set taxes tv such that this con-















Comparing these results with (5) and (6), it follows that the villagers' op-
portunity to secede induces the city to provide the socially optimal level of
public goods in both the city and the village after consolidation. The reason
is simple. When taking decisions on public goods supply, the urbanites inter-
nalize the interests of the villagers, because any rents that are being created
10This section is related to the literature on secession and taxation; see, in addition
to the papers already mentioned in the introduction, Buchanan and Faith (1987), Le
Breton and Weber (2003), Brink (2004), Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), and Haimanko,
Le Breton, and Weber (2005). Note that we dier from these papers in our focus on how
the opportunity to secede aects the incentive to consolidate.
11Allowing the city to secede does not aect any of our results. Neither does a cost of
secession to the city.
12We thus assume the following timing of the game: 1) Citizens and villagers vote on
consolidation; 2) Citizens and villagers vote on public goods provision; 3) If the city and the
village remained autonomous, the game ends and payos are realized. If the city and the
village consolidated, villagers vote on secession. 4) If the villagers voted against secession,
the game ends and payos are realized. If the villagers voted for secession, the city and
village become autonomous, there is a vote on public goods provision in both districts, the
game ends and payos are realized. Obviously, in equilibrium, villagers never consolidate
when they anticipate secession, and so a secession will never be part of an equilibrium
outcome.
17in the village through public good provision can be extracted by the urban-
ites by increasing the tax tv. Hence, urbanites raise public goods supply in
both the city and the village to the point where the joint marginal benet
from public goods equals marginal cost.
Next consider the incentive to consolidate of urbanites and villagers.
Clearly, as before, urbanites are always (at least weakly) in favor of con-
solidation. It is easy to verify that they are indierent when s =  = 0,
and strictly better o otherwise. The villagers, however, are only in favor
of consolidation in the case that the cost of secession are zero, s = 0. Only
in that case can the villagers be sure to be as well o under consolidation
as under autonomy. In all other cases, villagers are worse o as urbanites
extract all of their rents, including the quasi-rent that arises due to the cost
of secession s. Hence, even though consolidation results in socially optimal
public goods supply, it is politically feasible only in the knife-edge case where
s = 0.13 Note also that lump-sum transfers from the national government
are of no avail when s > 0, as they aect villager's utility under autonomy
and under consolidation in exactly the same way.
One may argue that, at least in some cases, the situation depicted above
is too extreme in that local governments are limited in their power to exer-
cise tax discrimination. In as far as this forces urbanites to share some of
the rents from consolidation with the villagers, such limitations on tax dis-
crimination increase the willingness of villagers to consolidate. The uniform
tax rule which we imposed in sections 2-4 is a case in point. As we have
seen, under this rule, when spillovers and the relative size of the village are
suciently large, villagers enjoy a rent from consolidation and hence support
consolidation. Urbanites may thus actually be better o when their power
to dierentiate taxes is limited, for it creates a credible commitment to share
some of the rents from consolidation with the villagers, which increases the
villagers' willingness to consolidate.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a simple model to study local public goods
provision, endogenous formation of municipalities, and the eects of trans-
fers from higher-level governments. A well-known result is that decentral-
ized public good provision leads to underprovision when there are positive
13When s = 0, the city and the village always consolidate, independent of the values
of , v, and c. When  = 0, consolidation produces the same outcome as autonomy.
When  > 0, spillover eects are fully internalized under consolidation, and the associated
increase in rents is fully captured by the urbanites.
18spillovers. We have shown that centralized public good provision may lead
to overprovision of local public goods in the largest district. Moreover, when
the spillover eects are small, centralized provision may aggravate underpro-
vision in the smallest district. As a rule, there are insucient incentives for
consolidation in the smallest district. A national government can alleviate
these problems by implementing a transfer scheme. We have considered an
earmarked transfer, acting upon the amounts of local public goods provided,
and a lump-sum transfer, aecting the incentives for consolidation. When
the national government is not fully informed about local preferences, these
transfers do not bring about the social optimum. Optimal transfers depend
crucially on the distribution of spillover eects over regions.
Our analysis can be extended in several important ways. Firstly, one
could drop the assumption that individuals are immobile, and introduce a
housing market, as in Calabrese, Cassidy, and Epple (2002). When mobility
is costless, housing prices in market equilibrium will be such that the utility
of urbanites and villagers is equal. The welfare eects of consolidation of
the city and the village will then be reected in a change in relative housing
prices. Further, when public goods are nanced by land or property taxes,
urbanites will have a stronger incentive to provide public goods in the vil-
lage, because the resulting increase in property values in the village is partly
recouped through taxes. Typically, individuals have a preference for living in
a certain district and moving to another district is therefore costly to them.
We conjecture that our main results will still hold with mobile individuals as
long as individuals are heterogenous in preferences for living in a particular
district. Housing prices will then equalize the utilities of the marginal in-
habitants of the city and the village. A nice feature of this extension is that
it could yield hypotheses that can be empirically tested using housing prices
before and after consolidation of municipalities (as in Brasington (2004), who
nds large eects of consolidation of public schooling provision on housing
prices in the US).
Secondly, consolidating districts could agree on changing political decision-
making rules, for example to require a supermajority vote instead of a simple
majority vote to pass a bill. As rules for decision-making in local politics are
typically determined at the national level, such a local agreement would at
best amount to a promise by one party (the city) to take into account the
interests of the other (the village) in political decision-making after consoli-
dation. Clearly, such a promise may easily lack credibility. More generally,
as Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) note and anecdotal evidence suggests, the
overall record of `cooperative federalism' has not been impressive. Strategic
delegation by local jurisdictions may be one reason for this (see Besley and
Coate (2003) and Dur and Roelfsema (2005)).
19Thirdly, we have restricted our analysis to the issue of what would be
a socially optimal transfer scheme. Obviously, policy makers at the central
level who decide on the transfers may have other interests, either because
they represent mainly urbanites (or villagers), or because they are responsive
to lobbying eorts by local governments, as in Borck and Owings (2003),
or because they can use intergovernmental grants to win votes in districts
with many swing voters, as in Johansson (2003). It would be interesting to
examine the interplay between political decision making at the central level
and at the local level, taking into account the ineciencies in local political
decision making that we have identied in this paper. Such an analysis may
also shed light on the incentives of national governments to protect political
minorities in jurisdictions, e.g. through legal limits on tax discrimination.
Fourthly, politicians and voters at the local level may have other motives
for consolidation than those stressed in our paper. Austin (1999) shows that
the current decisive voter may support consolidation so as to inuence the
identity of the decisive voter in the future. His empirical analysis suggests
that these political motives may be more important than economic motives.
Filer and Kenny (1980), on the other hand, do nd evidence that voters vote
in line with their dollar benets of consolidation. Similar results are found by
Srensen (2006). Using Norwegian data, he nds that support for consolida-
tion by local elected politicians increases with the potential eciency gains
from consolidation and decreases with districts' revenue disparities. Further,
and well in line with our results, it turns out that smaller municipalities are
often prepared to sacrice eciency gains to remain independent.
Lastly, the model could be extended so as to capture a number of other
features that appear to be important in political decision making on con-
solidation of municipalities and local public good provision, like asymmetric
spillovers (urbanites usually benet less from public goods provision in the
village than villagers benet from the city's public goods), income hetero-
geneity, and economies of scale in public good production. While the latter
may imply that inhabitants of small villages are more favorable to consolida-
tion than suggested by our analysis, the former two tend to strengthen the
villager's opposition.
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